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STATE V. URIOSTE: A PROSECUTOR'S DREAM AND
DEFENDER'S NIGHTMARE
AMANDA C. SANCHEZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Urioste,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that information
provided by an anonymous tip 2 was sufficiently corroborated 3 to constitute
reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. The Uriostedecision was the
first New Mexico Supreme Court decision to address whether reasonable suspicion
existed to justify an investigatory stop based upon an anonymous tip.5 As such,
Urioste serves as a prime example for illustrating the problems with the New
Mexico standard for determining reasonablesuspicion basedupon an anonymous
tip. Specifically, the problem with the New Mexico standard is that New Mexico
courts apply the totality of the circumstances to determine whether reasonable
suspicion exists.
Law enforcement officers are required to have reasonable suspicion prior to
making an investigatory stop; 7 however, it is difficult for a police officer to
determine what factors support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Unfortunately, the
decision in Urioste does not provide meaningful guidance as to what constitutes
reasonable suspicion based upon an anonymous tip under New Mexico law. The
* Class of 2005, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to express heartfelt thanks to
Professor Barbara Bergman, Professor Barbara Blumenfeld, Ocean Munds-Dry, and Sharon Hawk for their
invaluable guidance, knowledge, editing skills, supervision, and support during the development of this casenote.
I would also like to thank my family for their love, prayers, patience, and encouragement.
1. 2002-NMSC-023, 52 P.3d 964.
2. Id. 1 8, 52 P.3d at 968.
3. Corroboration occurs when a police officer verifies the informant's facts. See JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 9.04(D) (3d ed. 2002). It is yet to be determined what constitutes
sufficient corroboration. See generally Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 52 P.3d 964.
4. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-23, 17, 52 P.3d at 971.
5. See, e.g., State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, 1 10, 920 P.2d 1038, 1042 (information given by an
unknown informant provided reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop once the information was confirmed);
State v. Bedolla, 111 N.M. 448, 451, 806 P.2d 588, 591 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (information provided by an
anonymous Crimestoppers' tip was not sufficiently corroborated to form the basis of reasonable suspicion because
"the corroborated portions of the tip were readily available to any member of the public"); State ex rel. Taxation
& Revenue Dep't v. Van Ruiten, 107 N.M. 536, 539, 760 P.2d 1302, 1305 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (information
provided by an unidentified eyewitness was sufficient to form a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was driving
while intoxicated and justified the investigatory stop). Since Urioste, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has
decided another reasonable-suspicion case based upon an anonymous tip. See State v. Contreras, 2003-NMCA- 129,
1, 79 P.3d 1111, 1112 (anonymous tip provided sufficient information for a police officer to form a reasonable
suspicion to justify a brief investigatory stop of the defendant to confirm or dispel a suspicion of drunk driving).
However, Contrerasdoes not change the analysis of this casenote.
6. See State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017,
21, 25 P.3d 225, 233 ("In determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists, we examine the totality of circumstances."); State v. Affsprung, 115 N.M. 546, 549,
854 P.2d 873, 876 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) ("Reasonable suspicion must be judged by the totality of
circumstances."); State v. Estrada, I I N.M. 798, 801,810 P.2d 817, 820 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) ("In deciding the
issue, we examine the totality of circumstances at the time of detention."). But see State v. Gonzales, 1999-NMCA027,
20-26, 975 P.2d 355, 359-60 (the court applied the Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged test, which includes the
basis-of-knowledge prong and the credibility prong, to determine whether reasonable suspicion existed based upon
a confidential informant's tip); State v. Eskridge, 1997-NMCA-106, 19, 947 P.2d 502, 508 (in this reasonable
suspicion case, the court stated, "Defendant correctly points out that the trial court erred by testing the reliability
of the tip under the 'totality of circumstances' test from Illinois v. Gates,.. .instead of the two-prong AguilarSpinelli test adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Cordova.....) (citations omitted).
7. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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current approach also risks arbitrarily violating a suspect's Fourth Amendment
rights.
This casenote will evaluate the status of New Mexico reasonable suspicion law
in light of Urioste. It will discuss the factual and procedural issues that brought this
case to the New Mexico Supreme Court, the background leading to the court's
holding, the rationale of the Urioste court, an analysis of its decision, and the
implications that this decision will have on future police investigatory stops based
upon anonymous tips in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts of this case should concern anyone traveling the roads of New Mexico.
They begin with an anonymous tip and end with an investigatory stop that balanced
away Rudolfo Urioste's Fourth Amendment protection from an unreasonable search
and seizure. 8
On November 20, 1997, at approximately 4:30 P.M., the Tucumcari Police
Department received information from an unidentified informant 9 that a Hispanic
male with a long black ponytail would be transporting cocaine from Albuquerque
to Tucumcari.1o According to the informant, the suspect would be driving a green,
older model Ford Econoline van and was expected to arrive in Tucumcari around
10:30 P.M." In addition to the suspect's physical description, vehicle description,
direction of travel, time, and day, the tip also provided the suspect's residential
address in Tucumcari.12 Around 10:00 P.M., Officer Tony Alvidrez of the
Tucumcari Police Department relayed this information to Deputy Greg Greenlee of
the Quay County Sheriff's Department. 3
Deputy Greenlee was familiar with the Ford Econoline van at the address15
described.' 4 He drove to that location and observed that the van was not there.
Then he went to Interstate 40 and drove west toward Albuquerque.' 6 At approximately 10:14 P.M., Deputy Greenlee saw a green, older model Ford Econoline van
driving toward Tucumcari."7 The deputy turned around to follow the van.' 8 He
verified the make, age, and color of the van, as well as the apparent route of the van
as consistent with the earlier tip.'9

8. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 52 P.3d 964.
9. Id.
U 2, 7, 52 P.3d at 966-67. The court later concluded that the source of the information came from
an anonymous tip instead of a confidential informant. See id. 8, 52 P.3d at 968.
10. Id. 2, 52 P.3d at 966.
11. Id.
12. Id. (1115 South Fifth Street, Tucumcari).
13. Id.
14. Id. 3, 52 P.3d at 966 ("At the suppression hearing, Deputy Greenlee testified that he was familiar with
the vehicle at the address described above...."). However, neither the court's opinion nor Deputy Greenlee's police
report revealed how the deputy was familiar with the van or the address.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Based upon these consistencies, Deputy Greenlee stopped Rudolfo Urioste, who
was driving the van.2" Since Greenlee had been informed that the driver was
allegedly transporting cocaine, he suspected that Urioste might be armed so he
asked Urioste to get out of the van and submit to a frisk. 2' Deputy Greenlee also
asked Urioste whether he had any guns or drugs in his possession. 22 Urioste denied
having guns or drugs. 23 However, he did become "overly excited and was becoming
defensive., 24 After Greenlee told Urioste that he was going to pat him down,
Urioste "became more excited. '2' Deputy Greenlee attempted to place Urioste's
hand on the van, at which point, Urioste ran "around the van and east on the
interstate.,26 Despite the fact that Deputy Greenlee yelled for him to stop, Urioste
kept running toward a field.2 ' Deputy Greenlee eventually caught up with Urioste
and placed him under arrest.28 Urioste was arrested for evading and eluding an
officer.29
Between midnight and 1:00 A.M., several officers conducted a lengthy search of
the area for any contraband that Urioste might have thrown away while running.30
Although nothing was found at that time, cocaine was discovered in a search
conducted the next day.3'
In addition to being charged with evading and eluding an officer,3 2 Defendant
Rudolfo Urioste was also charged with possession of cocaine.33 In district court,
Urioste entered into a conditional plea to possession of cocaine, reserving the right
to appeal his conviction on the issue of suppression of the physical evidence of
cocaine.34 Urioste argued that the evidence of cocaine should have been suppressed
because the information leading to his arrest came from an anonymous tip that was
not sufficiently corroborated to establish reasonable suspicion as required by the

20. Id. 4, 52 P.3d at 966.
21. id. There is no indication in either the court's opinion orin Deputy Greenlee's police report that Urioste
consented to the frisk.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Officer G. Greenlee, Police Report, Quay County Sheriffs Dep't, Nov. 20, 1999 [hereinafter Police
Report].
25. Id.
26. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 4, 52 P.3d at 966; Police Report, supra note 24.
27. Urioste,2002-NMSC-023,1 4,52 P.3d at 966; see also Police Report, supranote 24 ("[H]e turned into
a gate area to enter the field.....).
28. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 4, 52 P.3d at 966.
29. Id. Evading and eluding an officer is a violation of NMSA 1978, § 30-22-1 (2003).
30. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 4, 52 P.3d at 966.
31. Id. At approximately 10:00 A.M. on the following day, officers searched the area and found a bag with
cocaine in the same area where Urioste had been arrested. Police Report, supra note 24. Urioste later admitted that
the cocaine was his. Id. The cocaine weighed nine grams and had a street value of $900.00. Id.
32. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 4, 52 P.3d at 966.
33. Id. N 1, 5, 52 P.3d at 966-67. Cocaine is a controlled substance and possession is prohibited under
NMSA 1978, § 30-31-23(D) (2003). Although the Urioste opinion states that Urioste "entered into a conditional
plea for possession of a controlled substance contrary to NMSA 1978, § 30-31-23(D) (1990)," Uioste, 2002NMSC-023,
1, 5, 52 P.3d at 966-67, Deputy Greenlee's police report states that Urioste was charged with
trafficking cocaine. Police Report, supranote 24. Trafficking cocaine is a violation of NMSA 1978, § 30-31-20
(2003). In addition, Deputy Greenlee's police report indicated that Urioste was also charged with tampering with
evidence. Police report, supranote 24. Tampering with evidence is a violation of NMSA 1978, § 30-22-5 (2003).
However, there is no indication of what happened with the tampering-with-evidence felony charge.
34. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023,
1, 5, 52 P.3d at 966-67.
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Fourth Amendment." The district court disagreed with the defendant for two
reasons: (1) the information came from a confidential informant, not an anonymous
informant, and (2) the information from the confidential informant and Deputy
sufficient to provide the police
Greenlee's corroboration of that information were
36
with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Urioste petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for certiorari after losing both
arguments on appeal. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the information supplied to Deputy
Greenlee came from an anonymous tip, not a confidential informant,37 and (2) the
anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to constitute reasonable suspicion to
support the investigatory stop.38 Thus, the issue raised by the New Mexico Supreme
Court's holding in Urioste is the question of what constitutes reasonable suspicion
based upon an anonymous tip.
111.
BACKGROUND
To properly understand the significance of Urioste,it is necessary to understand
the distinction between information supplied to a police officer from an anonymous
informant as opposed to that supplied by a confidential informant. Additionally, it
is imperative to understand existing Fourth Amendment law, both federal and state,
as it relates to probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
A. Anonymous Informants versus ConfidentialInformants
There is a distinction between information supplied by an anonymous informant
and information supplied by one who is confidential. An anonymous informant is
one that is, by definition, unknown.39 When an informant is unknown to law
enforcement, courts are less willing to accept the anonymous informant's tip
because the reputation of that informant cannot be assessed.' However, this does
not foreclose the acceptance of an anonymous tip. An anonymous tip could provide
the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigatory stop "only if accompanied
by specific indicia of reliability."'"
Conversely, a confidential informant is one that is known to law enforcement.4"
When an informant is known to law enforcement, courts are more willing to assign
validity to that information because the reputation of the confidential informant can
be assessed.4 3 Further, it is theorized that confidential informants are less likely to

35. Id. 1, 52 P.3d at 966.
36. Id.
37. Id. 8, 52 P.3d at 968.
38. Id. 17, 52 P.3d at 971.
39. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983)
("[Tihe veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is 'by hypothesis unknown and unknowable."')); see also
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 37 (2d pocket ed. 2001) ("Anonymous" is defined as "[n]ot named or identified.").
40. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,269 (2000) ("Anonymous tips, the Florida Supreme Court stated, are
generally less reliable than tips from known informants....").
41. Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)).
7-8, 52 P.3d at 967-68.
42. See Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023,
43. The central issue in cases involving informants "is whether the informant's information is so reliable
and complete that it makes past, present or pending criminal conduct sufficiently likely to justify a stopping of the

Summer 2004]

REASONABLE SUSPICION

lie because they can be held responsible if their allegations turn out to be
fabricated."4
In Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Floridav. J.L.,4 he suggests a hybrid
type of informant: one who maintains his anonymity while making himself known
by virtue of his conduct. According to Justice Kennedy, "a tip might be anonymous
in some sense yet have certain other features, either supporting reliability or
narrowing the likely class of informants, so that the tip does provide the lawful basis
for some police action. '"46 For instance, if "the tip predicts future conduct of the
alleged criminal," it may be more reliable.47 Another example would be "if an
unnamed caller with a voice which sounds the same each time tells police on two
successive nights about criminal activity which in fact occurs each night" and then
provides a third tip.48 Similarly, informants can place their anonymity at risk with
caller identification and voice recordings.49
B. The FourthAmendment Law Governing ProbableCause and Reasonable
Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits unreasonablesearches
and seizures.5" The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through incorporation
of the Fourth Amendment by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5' Therefore, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
subject to the exclusionary rule52 in both federal53 and state courts.54 The Fourth

designated person for investigation." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.4(h) (3d ed. 1996). Information from known informants is generally more reliable than
information from anonymous informants because a known informant's reputation can be assessed and can be held
responsible if the allegations turn out to be false. See J.L, 529 U.S. at 269; see also Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023,
8, 52 P.3d at 968.
44. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, i 7-8, 52 P.3d at 967-68.
45. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
46. J.L, 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 276.
50. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonablesearches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
51. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 5.04(B) ("In very general terms, this rule provides that evidence seized
by the police in violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be introduced by the prosecution in a criminal trial
of the victim of the unreasonable search or seizure.").
53. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
54. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding "that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court"); State v.
Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, 17, 25 P.3d 225, 232 ("The exclusionary rule requires suppression of the
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Amendment requires law enforcement officers to obtain valid warrants, based upon
probable cause, 55 prior to conducting a legal search and/or seizure.56 Probable cause
means "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." 57 Probable cause exists when
the facts and circumstances within an officer's personal knowledge, and of
which she has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves
to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that: (1) in the case of an
arrest, an offense has been committed and the person to be arrested committed
it; and (2) in the case of a search, a specifically described item subject to seizure
will be found in the place to be searched.58
Since Illinois v. Gates,59 the Supreme Court of the United States determines the
existence of probable cause using the totality of the circumstances approach.6 ° In
Gates, the Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged test 6' in favor of the
totality of the circumstances approach because the Court found the two-pronged test
too "rigid. 6' 2 However, in State v. Cordova,63 the New Mexico Supreme Court
retained the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test over the federal totality of the
circumstances approach because the "rigid" application has not proved to be a
problem in New Mexico courts. 64

fruits of searches and seizures conducted in violation of the New Mexico Constitution."); State v. Gutierrez, 116
N.M. 431, 436, 863 P.2d 1052, 1057 (1993) ("the exclusionary rule is binding upon the states") (citing Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961)).
55. The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
56. "[Wihenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred." Id. at 20 n.16.
57. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
58. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 9.02.
59. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
60. Gates took a radical step and decided to abandon the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test. Id. at 238
("[W]e conclude that it is wiser to abandon the 'two-pronged test' established by our decisions in Aguilar and
Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable
cause determinations.") (footnote omitted); see also LAFAVE, supranote 43, § 3.3(a) ("[T]he [Gates] majority took
a more radical step by deciding to abandon the 'two-pronged test'....").
61. The Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged test requires a showing of the informant's "basis of knowledge" and
"veracity." See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233; see also State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 213, 784 P.2d 30, 32 (1989).
62. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "[t]his totality of the circumstances approach is far more
consistent with [the Court's] prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigiddemand that specific 'tests' be
satisfied by every informant's tip." Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
63. 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).
64. Id. at 216, 784 P.2d at 35. The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the "rigid" application of the
two-pronged test "has not proved to be a problem in our state courts' application of the standard set forth in Rule
5-211(E)." Id. Rule 5-21 1(E) is referring to SCRA 1986, 5-211(E), which is now Rule 5-211 NMRA (2003). In
Cordova, the court of appeals noted that New Mexico courts have interpreted Rule 5-211 (E) based on the AguilarSpinelli two-pronged test. Cordova, 109 N.M. at 212, 784 P.2d at 31. The court of appeals further noted that "the
United States Supreme Court has since abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of a determination based on
'the totality of circumstances,"' set forth in Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. Cordova, 109 N.M. at 212, 784 P.2d at 31.
Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cordova to determine if the Gates decision had any
impact on Rule 5-211 (E). Id. The Cordova court concluded, "our previous reading of [Rule 5-211 (E)] comports
both with its plain meaning and with the requirement of the New Mexico Constitution....Id.
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Prior to 1967, "'searches' and 'seizures' were all-or-nothing concepts ' 65 based
on the standard of probable cause. In 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Camara v. Municipal,66 suggested a new and reduced standard for allowing
searches and seizures in the context of administrative searches based on something
less than probable cause.67 One year later, in Terry v. Ohio,68 the court extended this
new and reduced standard to investigatory stops by law enforcement officers.69 In
doing so, the Court articulated the modem stop-and-frisk doctrine based upon a
standard of reasonableness.7"
C. Reasonable Suspicion: Terry v. Ohio
There is no U.S. Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case of greater impact than
Terry v. Ohio7 1 with regard to daily activities of the police and people on the
street.72 Terry was a groundbreaking case recognizing that, because "searches and
seizures can vary in their intrusiveness,"7 3 so should the standard for determining
when a search and/or seizure is reasonable.7 4 Thus, the Terry Court introduced "a
lesser standard of cause than 'probable cause."' 75 This lesser standard is now known
as "reasonable suspicion. 76

65. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.01.
66. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
67. DRESSLER, supranote 3, § 18.01 ("In Camara, the Justices recognized a different form of 'probable
cause,' applicable in administrative-search cases, that is based on the general Fourth Amendment standard of
Ireasonableness."' The Court invoked a balancing test to determine "reasonableness." "[T]he individual's and
society's interests in the given type of administrative search were weighed against each other.") (footnote omitted)).
68. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
69. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.01.
70. Id. ("Terry transported Camara's 'reasonableness' balancing test from the realm of administrative
searches to traditional criminal investigations, and used it to determine the reasonableness of warrantless searches
and seizures, rather than merely to define 'probable cause."'); see also LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 9.1(d) (noting
that, in Camara, the Court "adopted a lower standard of probable cause for inspection warrants... Thus, a new
Fourth Amendment calculus was brought into being-one which was immediately recognized as pointing the way
toward the Court's acceptance of the rationale supporting stop and frisk. The balancing test of Camarawas quoted
and relied upon in Terry v. Ohio.").
71. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, a police officer observed two men pacing and peering in front of a store
window and then conferring with each other. A third man approached them and engaged in a brief conversation.
After the third man left, the other two men resumed pacing, peering, and conferring for about ten minutes. Then
the two men walked offtogether in the same direction that the third man had taken. The officer found this behavior
strange and he suspected that the men were "casing a job, a stick-up." As a police officer, he felt that it was his duty
to investigate further. The officer approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer, and asked them
for their names. In addition, the officer patted the men down to see whether they had weapons. The officer felt a
pistol in the breast pocket of defendant's overcoat and arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon. Id. at 5-7.
72. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.01 ("In terms of daily activities of the police, as well as the experiences
of persons 'on the street,' there is no Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case-not even Katz v. UnitedStates, [389
U.S. 347 (1967)]-of greater practical impact.") (footnote omitted).
73. Id.
74. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment protects "against unreasonable
searches and seizures," the courts interpret cases in terms of whether the search or seizure was reasonable.See U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
75. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.01.
76. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas first coined the term "reasonable
suspicion" in his dissenting opinion. Although the majority and concurring opinions mentioned phrases such as
"reasonable cause," "reasonableness," "reasonable grounds," "reasonable caution," "articulable suspicion," and
"justifiable suspicion," they never referred to the new reduced standard as "reasonable suspicion." See generally
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.01.
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In Terry, the Court upheld a brief stop-and-frisk of the suspects, despite the fact
that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the suspects or to search them.77 This
was the first time the Supreme Court held that a person can be seized shy of an
actual arrest.78 Even though the Court held that the pat-down conducted by the
officer was a "serious intrusion" on the defendant's privacy and, thus, a "search,"
it was "something less than a 'full' one." 79
According to Terry, the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security is reasonable
under the circumstances.8" To determine the reasonableness of police conduct:
it is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other
than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the
search (or seizure) entails."'"
Neutral and detached magistrates must evaluate whether a search or seizure was
reasonable on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular circumstances.82 Judges
also must assess the facts against an objective standard: "would the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?"8 3
After Terry, the Fourth Amendment was no longer limited to "full blown
searches ' 84' and "formal arrests,
which require probable cause. The Fourth
Amendment also prohibits unreasonable "stop-and-frisks, '8 6 including brief
investigatory stops 87 such as the one at issue. The Terry Court decided "stop-andfrisks" merely require reasonable suspicion.88
According to the Supreme Court of the United States:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only
in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that
is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause,

77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; see also DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.02.
78. DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.02.
79. Id.
80. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19. It is important to note that "reasonable under the circumstances" differs from
"reasonable to procure a search warrant." See generally DRESSLER, supra note 3, § 18.01.
81. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)).
82. Id.
at 21.
83. Id.
at21-22.
84. A "full-blown search" is a search for evidence of a crime. Id. at 8. This differs from a "frisk" of the outer
clothing for weapons. Id.
85. "An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution." Id. at 26. This differs from an "investigatory
'stop."' See id. at 8.
86. "[T] he police should be allowed to 'stop' a person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion
that he may be connected with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should
have the power to 'frisk' him for weapons." Id. at 10.
87. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980).
88. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). However, "[ilf the 'stop' and the 'frisk' give rise to
probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then the police should be empowered to make
a formal 'arrest,' and a full incident 'search' of the person." Id. at 10.
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but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that
is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.89
Law enforcement officers possess reasonable suspicion when they are "'aware of
specific articulable facts' that, judged objectively, 'would lead reasonable person
to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring. ' ' 9
D. Sufficient Corroboration:Alabama v. White
While Terry v. Ohio provides the background for reasonable suspicion, Alabama
v. White9' provides the background for Urioste's rationale for determining sufficient
corroboration. In White, the police received an anonymous telephone tip indicating
that Defendant Vanessa White would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace
Apartments at a specific time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right
taillight lens broken, and she would be driving to Dobey' s Motel.9 2 In addition, the
tip indicated that White would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside

a brown attach6 case.93 The police immediately went to the Lynwood Terrace
Apartments.94 Upon arrival, the police saw a vehicle matching the caller's
description in the parking lot in front of the 235 building.95 The police officers
observed White leave the 235 building and then drive off in the station wagon. 96
The officers followed the station wagon, which took "the most direct route to
Dobey' s Motel." 97 The police stopped White shortly before she reached the motel.98
White consented to a search, which revealed a locked brown attach6 case carrying
marijuana. 99 White was arrested for possession of marijuana."° At the station, the
police found three milligrams of cocaine in White's purse.'0 '
White was charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine. 0 2 She filed a
motion to suppress, which the trial court denied." 3 White then pleaded guilty to
both charges, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress."

89. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The Terry Court
recognized that a law enforcement officer "may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause
to make a valid arrest." Id. Based on reasonable suspicion, an officer can "stop" and briefly detain a suspect to
investigate suspicious behavior. To prove that reasonable suspicion existed to make an investigatory stop, a law
enforcement officer must be able to show a detached and neutral judge "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21; DREsSLER, supra
note 3, § 18.01 (Reasonable suspicion is "a lesser standard of cause than 'probable cause."').
90. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 1 6, 52 P.3d at 967 (quoting State v. Pallor, 1996-NMCA-083, 1 12, 923
P.2d 599, 600).
91. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
92. Id. at 327.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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According to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, the police officers did not
have the reasonable suspicion required under Terry v. Ohio0 5 to validate the
investigatory stop of White's vehicle."° Since there were differing views in the state
and federal courts over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion
for a stop, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari.1 7
The White Court concluded that the tip, standing alone, completely lacked the
necessary indicia of reliability.'° 8 However, the totality of circumstances revealed
that "significant aspects'" of the anonymous tip were suitably corroborated to
furnish reasonable suspicion to stop White.'09 The Court noted that not every detail
mentioned by the caller was verified."' Ultimately, the Court reversed the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Alabama and concluded that the anonymous tip in White had
been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion to stop White,"'
because "significant aspects of the caller's predictions were verified"' 1 2and because
the anonymous tipster was able to predict White's 'future behavior."' 13 Thus, the
Court found that the investigative stop in White did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 1'

E. Insufficient Corroboration:Florida v. J.L. and State v. Bedolla
A discussion of Florida v. J.L." 5 and State v. Bedolla 1 6 further informs the
analysis of the Urioste decision because the Urioste court distinguished its facts
from both J.L. and Bedolla in supporting its conclusion. In J.L., "an anonymous
caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a
particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun." ' 17 Sometime after
the police received the tip, 118 two police officers were instructed to respond. '19 They
arrived at the bus stop about six minutes later and observed three black males "just
hanging out. ' J.L., one of the three males, was wearing a plaid shirt. 12' Aside
122
from the anonymous tip, the officers had no reason to suspect criminal activity.
They did not see a gun, and J.L. made no threatening or unusual movements.' 23 One

105. 392 U.S. 1(1968).
106.
107.

White, 496 U.S. at 328.
Id.

108. Id. at 329.
109. Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 331.
111. Id.
112. Id.at 332.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 331.
115. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
116. 111 N.M. 448, 806 P.2d 588 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). Although the Urioste court cited several New
Mexico cases for various principles, it only made a factual comparison with Bedolla. See generally Urioste, 2002NMSC-023, 52 P.3d 964.

117. J.L, 529 U.S. at 268.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. ("[Tihe record does not say how long.").
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the officers approached J.L. and frisked him. 2 4 During the frisk, the officer
seized a gun from J.L.'s pocket.1 25 Although there were no allegations made against
26
the other two males, the second officer frisked them and found nothing.'
J.L., who was almost 16 years old, was charged under Florida law "with carrying
a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age
of 18." ' 27 The trial court granted J.L.'s motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an
unlawful search. 28
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the anonymous tip in J.L. lacked
sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop.' 29 The officers' suspicion that J.L.
was carrying a gun arose solely from an unidentified call made from an unknown
location. 30 The tip was not sufficiently corroborated by the officers' observations
and it provided no predictive information. 3 Therefore, the police had no means to
test the informant's knowledge or credibility. 3 2 The fact that J.L. actually had a gun
was not enough to establish that the police officers had reasonable suspicion prior
in J.L. was
to the frisks.' 33 The Court held that the investigatory stop-and-frisk
34
unconstitutional and a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In Bedolla, law enforcement officers received an anonymous Crimestoppers' tip
that two men were selling cocaine out of a room at the Navajo Motel. 35 According
to the informant, one of the men had a purple Nissan pickup truck with California37
plates. 136 The officers went to the Navajo Motel and conducted surveillance.
More than an hour after their arrival, a purple Nissan drove up. 138 Three Hispanic
males got out of the truck and went into a motel room. 39 Some time later, four
people came out of the Navajo Motel and got into the purple Nissan and a blue
Nissan with California plates. '40 Both vehicles left the motel.14' The police officers
followed the purple Nissan for about a quarter of a mile and then stopped the
vehicle, despite the fact that the officers had not observed any traffic violations or
any signs of criminal activity. 42 The only reason the officers made the investigatory

124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.

127. ld. at 269.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
conducted

Id.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. ("The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they
their search.") (emphasis added).

134. Id. at 269.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Bedolla, 111 N.M. at 449, 806 P.2d at 589.
Id.
Id.
Id.

139. Id.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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stop of the purple Nissan was because of the anonymous tip. 143 They simply
"wanted to confirm or dispel the information given by the informant."'"
Despite the fact that officers went to the motel and conducted surveillance for
over an hour, 45 the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that the officers failed to
sufficiently corroborate the anonymous tip prior to stopping the suspects after they
had left the motel and driven off.1" The officers' investigative work "yielded
nothing consistent with criminal behavior and corroborated nothing more of the tip
than that the purple Nissan vehicle existed,
that it had California tags, and that it
' 47
was driven by an unidentified person."'
IV. RATIONALE
As a preliminary matter, the Urioste court la4 was faced with the issue of whether
the information that led to Urioste's arrest came from an anonymous informant or
from a confidential informant. Defendant Urioste argued that it was an anonymous
informant rather than a confidential one that provided the tip. 49 Urioste based his
argument on Deputy Greenlee' s testimony at the suppression hearing where Deputy
Greenlee testified that he himself had received the information from Officer
Alvidrez of the Tucumcari Police Department, who had received the information
from an unidentified third person.' 0 Although Deputy Greenlee testified that
Officer Alvidrez had informed him that the third person was a "confidential
informant," "the State never called Officer Alvidrez to testify concerning whether
the information was from a known informant whose reputation could be assessed
15
and who could be held responsible if the allegations turned out to be fabricated."' '
Furthermore, Urioste argued that the tip must come from a reliable known source
or the details in the tip must be "'reliable in [their] assertion of illegality, not just
in [their] tendency to identify a determinate person. '"'152

The State contended that the information came from a confidential informant
because there was no evidence indicating that the information supplied came from
an anonymous tip. 153 The State asked the court to presume that a confidential
informant provided the information that led to Urioste's arrest. 54 However, the
State failed to present evidence that the information was from a known informant. 1

143. Id.
144.

Id.

145. Id. at 449, 451, 806 P.2d at 589, 591.
146. Id. at 451, 806 P.2d at 591.
147.

Id.

148. Justice Maes wrote the majority opinion in Urioste. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 52 P.3d 964. Chief
Justice Sema, Justice Baca, and Justice Franchini joined the opinion. Id. Justice Minzner dissented and filed a
separate opinion. Id.
149. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 7, 52 P.3d at 967.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. 18, 52 P.3d at 967-68.
152. Id. 7, 52 P.3d at 967 (quoting Florida v. J.L, 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (alterations in original)).
153. Id. 8, 52 P.3d at 968. Although the State invoked the "fellow officer rule," id., it seemed to suggest
that it was the defendant's burden to prove that the tip was from an anonymous informant, rather than the State's
burden to prove that the tip was from a confidential informant. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' findings that
the information came from a confidential informant. 5 6 The court held that, based
on these facts, the State should have made a stronger showing to establish that the
information came from a confidential informant.'57 Since the State failed to
establish that the information was from a reliable informant whose reputation could
be assessed or from a known source that could be held responsible if the allegations
were false,15 8 the court analyzed the source of the information as though it were
from an anonymous tip rather than a confidential informant.15 9
. After establishing that the information came from an anonymous informant, the
court then analyzed whether the information provided was accompanied by
"specific indicia of reliability" necessary to find sufficient corroboration to support
Greenlee's investigatory stop. To this end, the court engaged in an analysis of the
facts surrounding Deputy Greenlee's investigatory stop.
In its fact analysis, the Urioste court found that Deputy Greenlee sufficiently
corroborated the anonymous tip with his own observations 6 ' when he took
necessary actions to do so. First, Greenlee drove to the suspect's address and
verified that the green Econoline van was not there.161 Upon corroborating that the
van was not at the suspect's home, Greenlee then drove east toward Albuquerque
on Interstate 40 to corroborate the presence of the van on the highway as the tipster
had reported. 162 While driving east on Interstate 40, Greenlee observed a green,
older model Ford Econoline van driving west toward Tucumcari, just as the
informant had described.163 Further, Deputy Greenlee corroborated that the time the
informant said that the van was on the interstate was indeed the time that the
informant said it would be there.164 Based on the court's analysis of Greenlee's
actions, the court found that Greenlee had sufficiently corroborated the facts
provided by the anonymous tipster, thereby supplying the requisite reasonable
suspicion to support the investigatory stop. 165 Since Deputy Greenlee had
that
reasonable suspicion to briefly stop and detain Urioste, the court determined
66
Deputy Greenlee did not violate Urioste's Fourth Amendment rights. 1
To reach its conclusion that the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to
justify the investigatory stop, the New Mexico Supreme Court compared the facts
of Urioste with two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Alabama v. White 167 and Floridav.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
reasonable

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 1 17, 52 P.3d at 971.
Id. 3, 52 P.3d at 966.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 17, 52 P.3d at 971.
Id.
496 U.S. 325 (1990). In White, an anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to form the basis of
suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. Id.
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69
J.L. 168 Further, the Urioste court made a factual comparison with State v. Bedolla
70
adopted the time-oriented analysis of White. 171
and recognized that State v. Flores1
Ultimately, the Uriostecourt reached its conclusion by analogizing its facts to White
and distinguishing them from Bedolla and J.L.

A. The Urioste CourtAnalogized the Facts of Its Case to the Facts of White
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that Urioste "is nearly identical in all
relevant respects to White,"' 172 insofar as the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
anonymous tip in question was sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable
suspicion for the investigatory stop.173 Specifically, the Urioste court noted that in
both White and Urioste the anonymous tips provided descriptions of the suspects'
74
vehicles and were sufficiently corroborated by the investigating officers.
In White, the tipster indicated that the suspect would be driving a brown
Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens broken. 175 The police
corroborated this information. 176 Similarly, the Urioste tipster reported that the
suspect would be driving a green, older model
Ford Econoline van. 177 Deputy
78
information.
this
verified
Greenlee similarly
In addition to the corroboration of the vehicle descriptions, the Urioste court
noted that both the Urioste tipster and the White tipster were able to predict the
defendant's future behavior.179
The court posited that this was the most important
factor in establishing whether an officer has reasonable suspicion."'
Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual's
itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such
information is likely to also have access to reliable information about the
individual's illegal activities.... When significant aspects of the caller's
predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller

168. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). In J.L, an anonymous tip was not sufficiently corroborated to form the basis of
reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the subject. Id. at 268, 271, 274.
169. 111 N.M. 448, 806 P.2d 588 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
170. 1996-NMCA-059, 920 P.2d 1038. The Urioste court chose not to make a factual comparison with
Flores, despite the fact that the issue in Flores was whether an anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to
justify an investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, 1 1, 920 P.2d at 1040.
In Flores, an anonymous tip provided police the information that three vehicles had left Van Horn, Texas, together
on their way to Artesia, New Mexico, carrying 200 to 250 pounds of marijuana. Id. IN 2, 10,920 P.2d at 1040-42.
The tipster reported "a description of the vehicles, the time of departure, the direction of travel, and the
destination." Id. 9, 920 P.2d at 1042. Prior to the investigatory stop, the police had verified "the description of
the vehicles, the direction of travel, and the time of arrival at the described destination." Id. Thus, the court held
that the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to provide reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory
stop. Id. 1 10, 920 P.2d at 1042.
171. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 1 16, 52 P.3d at 970.
172. Id. 15, 52 P.3d at 970.
173. Id. 117, 52 P.3d at 971.
174. Id. 15, 52 P.3d at 970.
175. White, 496 U.S. at 327.
176. Id. at 326-27.
177. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 1 3, 52 P.3d at 966.
178. Id. IN 3, 17, 52 P.3d at 966, 971.
179. Id. I' 11, 16, 52 P.3d at 969-70.
180. Id. 1 14, 52 P.3d at 969.
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was honest
but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the
18
stop. 1

The Urioste court noted that in both Urioste and White, the informants correctly
told police the time defendants would be at a certain place and where their
movements would be taking them: 82
If the tipster can be said to be in on an action that is taken by the suspect in the
future, from the point of view of the time the tip is given, then as a matter of
law, the asserted illegality
can be associated with the prediction so as to increase
8 3
the reliability of the tip.
In addition to noting those facts that were corroborated by the officers in both
Urioste and White, the Urioste court also observed those facts that were not
corroborated by the respective officers. Specifically, the Urioste court observed that
the exact point of origin and the exact
84 destination of the suspect were not
corroborated in either Urioste or White.'
B. The Urioste Court DistinguishedIts Factsfrom the Facts of J.L. and Bedolla
The Uriostecourt distinguished Uriostefrom J.L., where the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk J.L.8 5
Although anonymous tipsters provided the information in both Urioste and J.L. that
led to the defendants' arrests, the Uriostecourt concluded that these two cases were
different because the anonymous informant in J.L. did not provide any information
with regard to J.L.'s future behavior, whereas the anonymous tipster in Uriostedid.
In addition, the Urioste court noted that the tip in J.L. did not show that the tipster
had knowledge of the concealed criminal activity," 6 whereas the Urioste tipster
knew where Urioste's "movements were likely taking him."'8 7
In addition to distinguishing its facts from J.L., the Urioste court also distinguished its facts from those in Bedolla, where the New Mexico Court of Appeals
held that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to support their investigatory
stop.' 88 According to the Urioste court, "[t]here was significantly more corroboration ' in Urioste, "including a description of the suspect, his vehicle, its
destination, its direction of travel, and the time and day the suspect would be
traveling on Interstate 40, to bring it out of the purview of Bedolla.... "

Instead,

the Urioste court concluded that Urioste fell under the purview of White.' 91
181. White, 496 U.S. at 332.
182. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 14, 52 P.3d at 969.
183. Id. (citing White, 496 U.S. 325).
184. Id. 15, 52 P.3d at 970. But see id. 124, 52 P.3d at 972 (Minzner, J., dissenting) ("I would characterize
White somewhat differently... .The police may not have seen the specific apartment from which the suspect
emerged, but I think it is fair to characterize the point of origin in White as corroborated.").
185. J.L, 529 U.S. at 271; see also Urioste,2002-NMSC-023, 12, 52 P.3d at 969 (summarizing the facts
and holding of J.L).
186. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 1 12, 52 P.3d at 969.
187. Id. 14,52 P.3d at 969.
188. Bedolla, 111 N.M. at 451, 806 P.2d at 591.
189. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, I 16, 52 P.3d at 970.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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In considering both federal and state case law, the Urioste court reached its
conclusion by analogizing the facts in Uriosteto the facts in White and distinguishing its facts from both J.L. and Bedolla. Although the majority of the court agreed
with this conclusion, there was a sole dissenter. Justice Minzner dissented and filed
her own opinion.
C. Justice Minzner's Dissent
Justice Minzner concurred with the majority's decision to analyze the
information Officer Alvidrez of the Tucumcari Police Department gave Deputy
Greenlee as an anonymous tip.192 In addition, Justice Minzner concurred with the
majority's
decision to compare the facts of Urioste with the facts of White 193 and
194
J.L.

However, Justice Minzner dissented from the majority's holding that there was
sufficient corroboration to establish reasonable suspicion prior to stopping Urioste'196s
van.' 95 In her opinion, this was an invalid investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio
because Deputy Greenlee stopped Urioste on the highway before he had developed
the reasonable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment.' 97 Specifically, Justice
Minzner noted that Deputy Greenlee did not see the driver of the van until after he
had stopped Urioste.' 9g In addition, Greenlee did not testify that he recognized the
van that he stopped prior to stopping it.' 99
Justice Minzner also disagreed with the majority's finding that Deputy Greenlee
corroborated the tip because he passed by the residence provided by the tipster and
observed that Urioste's van was not there. According to Justice Minzner, the fact
that the van was not at the residence provided by the informant when Deputy
Greenlee passed by did not corroborate that the van the deputy later observed on
Interstate 40 was the van ordinarily located at that residence.2 °0
Although Justice Minzner agreed with the majority that the Urioste tipster
predicted "future behavior,""'' she noted that Deputy Greenlee failed to corroborate
any future behavior, because he stopped Urioste before that future behavior could
occur.20 2 Consequently, Justice Minzner concluded that the facts of Urioste were
analogous to J.L. rather than those of White. °3 In analogizing to J.L., Justice

192.
193.

Id. 1 19, 52 P.3d at 971 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
496 U.S. 325 (1990).

194. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
195.
196.
197.

Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023,

19, 26, 52 P.3d at 971, 973 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
19, 52 P.3d at 971 (Minzner, J., dissenting).

198. Id. ( 22-23, 52 P.3d at 972 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
199. Id. 22, 52 P.3d at 972 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id. 25, 52 P.3d at 972 ("that an Hispanic male with a long black ponytail who lived at 1115 South
Fifth Street in Tucumcari would drive from Albuquerque to Tucumcari at about 10:30 P.M.") (Minzner, J.,
dissenting).

202. Id. (Minzner, J., dissenting) ("[A]Ithough the tip did predict future behavior... prior to the stop Deputy
Greenlee only observed facts that were consistent with the tip, rather than confirming that the tipster had predicted
the suspect's movements.").
203. Id. 129, 52 P.3d at 973 (Minzner, J., dissenting). Justice Minzner also noted that J.L. is a more recent
opinion and was a unanimous result, whereas White, the older opinion, was not. Id. 1 30, 52 P.3d at 973 (Minzner,
J., dissenting).
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Minzner concluded that Urioste's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
investigatory stop on the highway 2° and, therefore, would have granted Urioste's
motion to suppress the cocaine.2 °5
V. ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS
The Urioste court's finding that the tipster in this case was anonymous was a
reasonable conclusion based on exclusion when the court found that the State failed
to prove that the information came from a known source. However, by analyzing
whether this anonymous tipster provided the officer with reasonable suspicion
under a totality of the circumstances approach, the Urioste court veered from
applicable values held by the New Mexico Supreme Court regarding a person's
right to be free from unreasonable intrusion under article II, section 10 of the state
constitution.2°
Accordingly, this analysis will not focus on whether the Urioste court correctly
or incorrectly concluded this case based on one fact or another in comparison to one
case or another. Such an analysis would be futile. Because the Urioste court applied
the totality of the circumstances approach to reach its conclusion, its conclusion is
well supported by cases coming down on either side of the question. Thus, any
criticism of the Urioste decision is not with the result itself; rather, it is with the
court's affirmation of the totality of the circumstances approach as the test for
determining the sufficiency of corroboration based on an anonymous tip in
reasonable suspicion cases. This analysis focuses on the concerns inherent in
relying upon an anonymous tip as the basis of reasonable suspicion for investigatory
stops, including the tensions it creates between an individual's right to be free from
unreasonable detainment, law enforcement's need to use discretion to get its job
done, and the judiciary's need to use its judgment when deciding cases.
By reasoning that the tipster was unknown to law enforcement, the court reasonably found that both the tipster' s reliability and credibility were at issue.2"7 However, by applying the traditional post hoc totality of the circumstances approach, the
Urioste court missed an opportunity to provide any sort of real framework for
determining how to analyze the basis of knowledge and veracity of an anonymous
tip to form the basis of reasonable suspicion. This opportunity was well within the
grasp of the Urioste court. Specifically, the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test 0 8

204. Id. 1 19, 52 P.3d at 971 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. See Cordova, 109 N.M. at 213, 784 P.2d at 31 n.j (rejecting the Gates totality of the circumstances
approach and retaining the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test based on an interpretation of the New Mexico
Constitution, article II, section 10); N.M. CONST. art. 11,§ 10 ("The people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person
or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor without
a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.").
207. See Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 7, 52 P.3d at 967.
208. See DRESSLER, supranote 3, § 9.04 (explaining that Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), first stated

the two-pronged test for determining the trustworthiness of informant's information, which includes the "basis of
knowledge" prong and the "veracity" prong while Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), explained the
two prongs by asking (1) "[h]ow did the informant get the information?"; and (2) "[wlhy should I [the magistrate]
believe the person?"). The two-prong test basically seeks to determine the informant's credibility and reliability.
Id.
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speaks directly to this concern. The first prong questions the informant's "basis of
knowledge" or credibility. Once the credibility has been established, the second
prong seeks to determine the "veracity" or reliability of the information provided.
Although the New Mexico courts apply the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test to
determine the "basis of knowledge" and "veracity" of anonymous informants in
probable cause cases,2°9 the Urioste court chose to affirm a less objective approach
in reasonable suspicion cases."' However tempting it may be to accept the Urioste
court's perpetuation of the totality of the circumstances approach in New Mexico,
it is ill-advised to do so.
One could reason that, because probable cause is a higher standard than
reasonable suspicion, it should follow that accountability for ensuring probable
cause should also be higher. However, this reasoning is shortsighted and never gets
to the core of this issue. As a starting point, the Fourth Amendment protects an
individual's right to privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures.21'
Furthermore, in Terry, the Supreme Court of the United States held that cases
involving reasonable suspicion also implicate an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights.21 2 The policy underpinning Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is an
individual's right to be free from unreasonable intrusion. Thus, the values
underpinning an individual's Fourth Amendment rights remain the same under both
probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
In circumstances that require the lower standard of reasonable suspicion,21 3 the
Urioste court upholds the use of sufficient corroboration based on the totality of
circumstances approach to determine whether an anonymous tipster is reliable and
credible.21 4 Unlike the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test, which provides a
meaningful structure for magistrates to determine the reliability and credibility of
an anonymous tipster before issuing any warrant, the sufficient corroboration based
on totality of the circumstances approach fails to provide a similarly objective
measure to assist officers in their decision-making process. 2" Thus, unlike the
Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test applied by a magistrate in probable cause

209. See Cordova, 109 N.M. at 212,784 P.2d at 31 n.1 (retaining the two-prongedAguilar-Spinellitest for
probable cause determinations and noting that "[blecause our holding today is based on our interpretation of the
New Mexico Constitution, we do not consider as controlling the principles announced in Gates or the other federal
precedents cited in the body of this decision, albeit the reasoning of those opinions informs our results"); see also
State v. Eskridge, 1997-NMCA-106, 19, 947 P.2d 502, 508 ("Our Supreme Court in Cordova retained a twoprong test first articulated (and later abandoned) by the United States Supreme Court to ensure the trustworthiness
of an informant's tip before that tip can be used as probable cause in support of a search warrant.").
210. See supranote 6.
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
212. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-20 (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to stop-and-frisk and
investigatory stops).
213. See generally id. (discussing investigatory stops and stop-and-frisks that require the reasonable
suspicion approach).
214. See generally Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, 52 P.3d 964.
215. See generally Paul G. Hawthorne, Tips, Returning to and Improving upon Aguilar-Spinelli: A
Departurefrom the Gates "Totality of the Circumstances," 46 How. L.J. 327 (2003).
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determinations, 2 6 the totality of the circumstances approach provides little
protection against a police officer's unreasonable investigatory stop in the first
instance. Consequently, it is anomalous that the New Mexico courts apply the
Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged analysis to probable cause while applying the totality
of circumstances approach to reasonable suspicion. Specifically, by applying the
totality of the circumstance approach to cases in which police officers make the
determination of reasonableness in the first instance, the Urioste court provides
lesser protections to individuals in a situation where it should provide greater
protections.
Further, and most importantly, by engaging in an exercise of factual comparisons
in an effort to analyze the totality of circumstances particular to one case, the
Urioste court lost sight of those principles relied upon by the New Mexico Supreme
Court in deciding probable cause cases under article II, section 10 of the New
Mexico Constitution.2 17 Thus, while the New Mexico Supreme Court has chosen to
provide broader probable cause protections by explicitly rejecting the totality of the
circumstances approach and retaining the Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged test, 218 the
Urioste court did not apply its same guiding principles to an individual's rights
under the reasonable suspicion standard.
In affirming the totality of the circumstances approach, the Urioste court failed
to recognize that whether a court sits in judgment of the reasonableness of probable
cause or whether it sits in judgment of the reasonableness of reasonable suspicion,
the principles underpinning either are nonetheless the same. Thus, these principles
should resonate with equal force when a New Mexico court sits in judgment over
whether a magistrate validly issued a search warrant under the probable cause
standard or whether an officer had reasonable suspicion when acting upon an
anonymous tip for purposes of an investigatory stop. Consequently, the Urioste
court should have been just as willing to reject the totality of the circumstances
approach for reasonable suspicion and, instead, apply the Aguilar-Spinelli test in
determining the issue before it.
The Aguilar-Spinelli test enunciates a better-reasoned and structured test to
determine whether information from an anonymous tip is reliable and credible.2 19
Further, it provides meaningful guidance to law enforcement officers who must
make on-the-spot decisions. Moreover, New Mexico courts will be better situated

216. See Cordova, 109 N.M. at 213, 784 P.2d at 32.

217. See N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10.
218. See Cordova, 109 N.M. 211,784 P.2d 30 (1989). New Mexico must provide at least the same amount
of protection for criminal defendants as the U.S. Constitution provides. However, New Mexico can also provide
greater protection, if it chooses to do so. Fundamental to our federal system of government is that "state courts are
absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than do
similar provisions of the United States Constitution." Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995); see also Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,967 (Mass. 2003) ("The genius of our Federal system is that each State's
Constitution has vitality specific to its own traditions, and that, subject to the minimum requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, each State is free to address difficult issues of individual liberty in the manner its own
Constitution demands."); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431,863 P.2d 1052 (1993). In Gutierrez, the court provided
broader protections under article H, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution by holding that the good-faith
exception to the federal exclusionary rule was incompatible with state constitutional protections.
219. See generally Hawthorne, supra note 215.
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to evaluate whether the police had reasonable suspicion prior to the investigatory
stop at issue.
In the case of Mr. Urioste, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that, based
on the totality of the circumstances, the anonymous tip had been "sufficiently
corroborated" because the tip was reliable.22 ° Consequently, the Uriostecourt found
reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop. Had the court used the AguilarSpinelli test, the Uriostecourt may or may not have reached a different conclusion.
However, application of the more objective Aguilar-Spinelli test would at least
provide against reasonableness determinations based on nothing more than one
court's assessment of the facts and a flip of the coin.22'
It is long accepted that the courts and police officers have discretion to determine
probable cause and reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances
approach.222 However, the Aguilar-Spinellitest would provide our police officers
with a better mechanism for determining whether they should act on an anonymous
tip in the first instance. Further, if an individual officer's actions are brought into
question, the Aguilar-Spinellitest will provide our courts, in the second instance,
with a more objective way to determine whether reasonable suspicion indeed
existed. Adoption of this framework coincides with the values underpinning New
Mexico's standard for determining probable cause.223 Moreover, it would likely lead
to better accountability of decision makers, predictability in the law, and efficiency.
Currently, under the totality of the circumstances approach, a court must base its
decision solely on a tedious factual comparison between every case on point, federal
or state. This factual comparison is not only tedious, but it also forces the user, be
it law enforcement or the courts, to rely completely on external sources to determine
whether the facts of a particular case square with the facts of another case. While
this type of approach may be adequate for the courts applying retrospective
analysis, it in no way provides officers with the tools necessary to make this
decision in the first instance. The Aguilar-Spinellitest would provide officers with
a prospective mechanism for determining reasonable suspicion in the first instance.
Since the New Mexico courts are more protective of individual liberty and
equality than the federal courts in terms of probable cause,224 they should also
demand broader protection for fundamental rights when evaluating reasonable
suspicion.TheAguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged test retained in Cordovaprovides more

6, 10, 17,52 P.3d at 967,968,971.
220. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023,
221. The Urioste court concluded that Urioste and White were "nearly identical in all relevant respects." Id.
15, 52 P.3d at 970. However, the reason why the Uriostecourt chose to analogize its facts with White and to
distinguish them from J.L and Bedolla is unconvincing. The court could have chosen to go either way and its
reasoning is unclear. Similarly, the court could have decided Urioste in line with another New Mexico case.
222. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002) ("When discussing how reviewing courts should
make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the 'totality of the
circumstances' of each case.....); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (abandoning the "rigid" Aguilar-Spinelli
two-pronged test in favor of the "totality of the circumstances" approach).
223. See Cordova, 109 N.M. 211,784 P.2d 30.
224. For example, with regard to probable cause analyses, the New Mexico courts do provide greater
protection by applying the Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged test rather than the "totality of circumstances" approach.
Compare Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), abrogatedby Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Cordova, 109 N.M. at 213, 784 P.2d at 32, with Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983) (abandoning the two-pronged test and adopting the "totality of circumstances" approach).
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guidance to police officers and jurists 225 because it provides a more structured test

than the totality of circumstances approach. 226 Therefore, it can be seen that the
Urioste court not only missed out on an opportunity to clarify a less then clear area
of the law, it also ignored its own philosophy when failing to reject the totality of
the circumstances approach as an adequate test to determine the reliability and
credibility of an anonymous tipster in the context of reasonable suspicion. Instead,
227
the Urioste court acquiesced to the federal totality of the circumstances approach
and perpetuated existing New Mexico jurisprudence with regard to reasonable
suspicion.2 28 Its failure to adopt the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test over the
federal totality of the circumstances approach is disconcerting and not in line with
Cordova.
VI. CONCLUSION
Urioste is the first New Mexico Supreme Court case to address reasonable
suspicion based upon an anonymous tip. In affirming the totality of the circumstances approach to form the basis of reasonable suspicion, the Uriostecourt missed
an opportunity to clarify New Mexico jurisprudence and follow its reasoning set
forth in Cordova. By perpetuating the more flexible totality of circumstances
approach in determining reasonable suspicion, there is a potential risk that the
Fourth Amendment right to privacy will soon be eroded. Hopefully, the next time
the court is faced with this issue, it will take a stronger position to coincide with its
reasoning in Cordova, adopt the Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged test for reasonable
suspicion determinations based upon anonymous tips, and add clarity to New
Mexico jurisprudence. Until the New Mexico Supreme Court decides to reject the
totality of the circumstances approach in favor of the Aguilar-Spinellitwo-pronged
test, Urioste will remain a prosecutor's dream case and a defense attorney's
nightmare.

225.

For synonyms of "jurists," see WnLiAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 304 (1980).

226. See White, 496 U.S. at 328-29 (describing the difference between the totality of circumstances approach
and the Aguilar-Spinellitest and indicating that the totality of circumstances approach requires a "lesser showing");
see generally Hawthorne, supra note 215.

227. See supra note 222.
228.

See supra note 6.

